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Abstract—In 2012, the IEEE introduced IEEE Std 802.15.6 as
the communication standard for Wireless Body Area Networks
(WBANs). All key agreement protocols offered by this standard
have been shown to exhibit grave security weaknesses. However,
to date, no key agreement protocol has been proposed which
fulfills all the requisite security and privacy objectives for
deployment in a resource constrained WBAN environment. In
this paper, based upon symmetric cryptographic primitives only,
a key agreement protocol is presented which, in addition to good
performance also offers the desirable privacy attributes of node
anonymity and session unlinkability. The protocol is also suitable
for post-quantum deployment scenarios as it is independent of
any public key based operations.
Index Terms—Anonymity, authenticated key agreement,
energy-efficiency, forward-secrecy, unlinkability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) consist of minia-
turized computing devices which can be fitted inside or around
the human body [1]. Through use of short range communica-
tion technologies, these devices talk to a designated central-
ized node (Hub) which further communicates with external
networks via a Gateway [2]. The general layout of a typical
WBAN is illustrated in Fig 1. Mindful of the peculiarities
of communicating in and around the human body, the IEEE
published IEEE Std 802.15.6 [3] for WBAN communications
in 2012. As high power transmissions are harmful to humans
and nodes in a WBAN are energy constrained, this standard
provisioned an optional two-hop communication architecture
to enable resource-constrained nodes to minimize transmis-
sions when communicating with the Hub.
In addition to conventional security guarantees, privacy
is of utmost importance for typical target application areas
such as healthcare and the military [4]. The session key
agreement methods of IEEE Std 802.15.6 have been shown
to have security weaknesses [5], but also do not provide the
privacy features that should be expected of a WBAN [6].
In this paper, we present a key agreement protocol which
renders comprehensive range of security and privacy properties
considered essential [6] for WBANs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II discusses requisite security and privacy attributes of
a key agreement protocol for WBANs. Section III, provides
an overview and analysis of a WBAN key agreement scheme
proposed in [7]. The new protocol is detailed in Section IV.
Section V provides analysis of the proposed protocol while
Fig. 1: Generic architecture of a typical WBAN
Section VI provides future research directions and concludes
the paper.
II. SETTING THE SCENE
In this section we present a network and adversary model for
WBAN key agreement and elaborate upon the desired security,
privacy and functional objectives.
A. System Model
We begin by describing a system model suitable for the
deployment scenarios of WBANs. In this model, a System
Administrator (SA) initializes the network. The network is
composed of three types of nodes; a Hub Node (HN),
Intermediary Nodes (IN) and Normal Nodes (N). As the HN
is usually a resourceful device with better hardware protection
mechanisms in place, we assume it to be trusted and its secret
Master Key to be protected. Normal nodes N are resource
constrained and their transmission range is assumed to be
limited; in particular, they are not always able to communicate
directly with HN . Intermediary nodes IN are also located in
and around the body but, at a particular time instance, are in
direct communication with both N and HN , thus acting as
intermediary nodes for the purpose of relaying traffic between
HN and N when required.
B. Objectives
The security of traffic in IEEE Std 802.15.6 is protected
using authenticated encryption, which requires the establish-
ment of symmetric session keys. The procedure for agreeing
these keys is thus critical to the overall security and privacy
of a WBAN. Keeping the previously defined model in mind,
a Privacy-Preserving Key Agreement (PPKA) protocol, to
be executed between a node N and HN , should have the
following properties:
1) Security Properties:
Mutual Entity Authentication [8] between N and HN .
Mutual “Implicit” Key Authentication [8] between N and
HN .
Known Key Security, meaning that compromising a session
key in one session should not impose any threat to the session
key security in any other sessions.
Key Randomness, meaning that any successful key agreement
should output a uniformly distributed session key amongst the
set of all possible session keys [9].
Replay Prevention. An adversary should not be able to
successfully replay previously captured copies of legitimate
messages between the protocol participants.
Desynchronization Resistance. If the authentication param-
eters get updated during the protocol execution, then usually
the participants need to have the same updated values at the
end of a protocol run. Otherwise, they will not authenticate
each other in later sessions and we say they have been
desynchronized. In a desynchronization attack, the adversary
forces the protocol participants to update their authentication
parameters to different values. A PPKA needs to be resistant
to these types of attacks.
2) Privacy Properties: We focus on two privacy aspects:
Node Anonymity. An adversary A, who is observing all
communications, should not be able to learn the identity of
any node N who is participating in a PPKA protocol with
HN . The privacy attribute of anonymity is a necessity for
typical application scenarios of WBANs, like healthcare and
military.
Session Unlinkability. An adversary A , who is observing
communications, should not be able to link one successfully
executed PPKA session of node N to another successfully
completed session of the same node. Session unlinkability
is imperative in addition to anonymity. Although, the PPKA
sessions could be anonymous, if the adversary is able to
link various PPKA sessions and group them together then
A would be able to attribute a group to a particular node
with high probability, due to his knowledge of the operations
of the WBAN. For example, consider a medical WBAN in
which a pacemaker is supposed to communicate with the
remote healthcare providers every five minutes, while the body
temperature sensor communicates only three times per day.
3) Functional Requirements:
Support for Multi-Hop Communication. As discussed in
Section I, depending upon the network topology, nodes would
either be communicating directly with the Hub Node HN or
via an Intermediary Node IN . Therefore, the PPKA protocol
should be designed to be suitable for both single-hop and two-
hop communication modes of [3].
Energy Consumption. As nodes in WBAN are severely en-
ergy constrained, the PPKA protocol needs to be minimalistic
in terms of computation, communication and storage overhead.
TABLE I: Notations used in [7]
Symbol Description
h(.) Cryptographic hash function
(a, b) Concatenation of a and b
⊕ Bitwise XOR operation k
SA System Administrator
N Normal Node
HN Hub Node
IN Intermediary Node
idN Long term secret/identity of node N
id′IN Relay identity of node IN
tidN Temporary identity of node N
kHN Master secret key of HN
kN , fN Temporary secret parameters chosen by HN
rN Temporary secret parameter chosen by N
aN , bN Authentication parameters stored in N
xN , yN Auxiliary authentication parameters
α, β, γ, η, µ Authentication parameters computed by HN
kS Shared session key
tN Timestamp generated by node N
X → Y : Z Entity X sends message Z to entity Y
Energy consumption in WBANs is dominated by radio com-
munications [10], which mainly depends on the number of
bits to be transmitted within the network. Consequently, the
PPKA protocol should be designed such that the number of
bits to be exchanged between the protocol participants and the
computational overhead for nodes N should be minimal.
Stateless HN . The network topology in WBANs is dynamic,
some nodes go in to “sleep mode” for energy conservation
purposes while others may be removed from the system upon
completion of their useful life. However, the HN is the
consistent nucleus of the network, its non-accessibility to other
nodes potentially devastating on the overall functionality of the
WBAN. After the network initialization we can not expect it
to remain inaccessible to the network, even temporarily, for
maintenance activities i.e. updation of security parameters,
updation of list of nodes in the network, etc. Consequently,
an important functional requirement is that HN should be
independent of the network dynamism and ideally no states
about the network nodes need to be maintained by it.
C. Related Work
Toorani [5] discovered various security weaknesses in the
key agreement methods of IEEE Std 802.15.6. Wang and
Zhang [11] proposed a key agreement scheme for WBANs that
claimed to provide anonymity and unlinkability in addition to
the requisite security guarantees. However, Jiang et al. [12]
demonstrated that [11] is vulnerable to client impersonation
attack and thus lacks mutual authentication. They proposed
an authenticated key agreement scheme which rectified this
flaw. However, their scheme was based on computing bilinear
pairings; which is not suitable for deployment in resource-
constrained WBANs. To avoid the overhead of managing
public-key certificates, He et al. proposed a certificateless
authentication scheme [13], which provides anonymity and
unlinkability. However, the computation and communication
overheads associated with their scheme also render it un-
N IN HN
〈idN , aN , bN 〉 〈id′IN 〉 〈id′IN , kHN 〉
Picks rN , generates timestamp tN Checks that id
′
IN exists and validates tN
Computes xN = aN ⊕ idN , Computes k∗N = kHN ⊕ aN ⊕ bN ,
yN = xN ⊕ rN , < tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN > < tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id
′
IN > x
∗
N = h(kHN , k
∗
N ), id
∗
N = x
∗
N ⊕ aN ,
tidN = h(idN ⊕ tN , rN ) r∗N = x∗N ⊕ yN , tid∗N = h(id∗N ⊕ tN , r∗N )
Verify that tidN
?
= tid
∗
N , Picks fN ,
Computes f∗N = xN ⊕ α, Computes α = xN ⊕ fN , γ = rN ⊕ fN
β
∗
= h(xN , rN , f
∗
N , η, µ) Picks new k
+
N , Computes
Verifies β∗ ?= β. Computes γ = rN ⊕ fN , a+N = idN ⊕ h(kHN , k+N ),
a
+
N = γ ⊕ η, b+N = γ ⊕ µ, b+N = kHN ⊕ a+N ⊕ k+N , η = γ ⊕ a+N ,
kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN )
< α, β, η, µ > < α, β, η, µ, id
′
IN > µ = γ ⊕ b+N , beta = h(xN , rN , fN , η, µ),
Replaces (aN , bN ) with (a
+
N , b
+
N ) kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN )
Stores session key kS Stores session key kS
Fig. 2: Li et al.’s Protocol
suitable for WBAN deployment. Very recently, Li et al. [7]
presented an authenticated key agreement scheme suitable for
WBANs based only upon symmetric cryptographic primitives.
This is an attractive proposal, since there is no requirement of
any additional infrastructure, and the associated computation
and communication overheads are negligible. The authors
claim that this scheme achieves almost all of the security and
privacy objectives defined in Section II-B.
D. Our Contributions
The contributions of this paper are as below:
• We analyse the scheme described in [7] which shows that
the proposed scheme does not provide session unlinkabil-
ity and forward secrecy. We further highlight additional
flaws in this scheme, which hinder its functionality.
• We propose a key agreement protocol that improve
upon [7] and provisions requisite security and privacy
properties, while preserving the efficiency offered by the
original scheme.
III. LI ET AL.’S SCHEME
In this section we present an overview and analysis of Li
et al.’s scheme [7]. For ease of comparison we use the same
notation (details in Table I) as in [7].
A. The Key Agreement Protocol
Li et al.’s PPKA protocol between the Hub node (HN) and
a node (N) consists of three phases. For a pictorial overview
of the protocol the reader is referred to Fig. 2.
1) Initialization Phase: The (SA) generates a master secret
key kHN and stores it in HN .
2) Registration Phase: The SA generates a unique secret
identity idN for node N . It then randomly chooses the
temporary secret parameter kN and calculates aN = idN ⊕
h(kHN , kN ) and bN = kHN ⊕ aN ⊕ kN . A unique id′IN for
the intermediary node (IN) is chosen and the parameters
〈idN , aN , bN 〉 and 〈id′IN , idN , aN , bN 〉 are stored in N and
IN respectively, while id′IN is stored by HN as the identity
of IN when communicating in relay mode.
3) Authentication Phase: We can think of the authentica-
tion phase of Li et al.’s scheme as a two-pass protocol. The
individual steps are outlined below:
Step 1: N → IN : 〈tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN 〉. N picks a
random rN and creates timestamp tN . Then it computes
xN = aN⊕idN , yN = xN⊕rN and tidN = h(idN⊕tN , rN )
and forwards the tuple 〈tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN 〉 to IN .
Step 2: IN → HN : 〈tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id′IN 〉. IN adds
its relay identity id′IN to the tuple and forwards it to HN .
Step 3: HN → IN : 〈α, β, η, µ, id′IN 〉. After receiving the
parameters from IN , HN verifies the relay identity id′IN from
its database and substantiates the validity of the timestamp tN .
Upon success of these checks, it computes k∗N = kHN⊕aN⊕
bN , x
∗
N = h(kHN , k
∗
N ), id
∗
N = x
∗
N ⊕ aN , r∗N = x∗N ⊕ yN
and tid∗N = h(id
∗
N ⊕ tN , r∗N ). It then verifies whether
tidN
?
= tid∗N . Then, a random fN is chosen and α = xN⊕fN
and γ = rN⊕fN are computed. Then a new k+N is picked and
a+N = idN ⊕ h(kHN , k+N ), b+N = kHN ⊕ a+N ⊕ k+N , η = γ ⊕
a+N , µ = γ⊕b+N , β = h(xN , rN , fN , η, µ) are computed. The
shared session key is computed as kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN )
and is stored in memory. Finally, HN forwards the tuple
〈α, β, η, µ, id′IN 〉 to IN .
Step 4: IN → N : 〈α, β, η, µ〉. IN removes the relay identity
id′IN from the received tuple and forwards 〈α, β, η, µ〉 to N .
Step 5: Upon receipt of the response from IN , N com-
putes f∗N = xN ⊕ α and β∗ = h(xN , rN , f∗N , η, µ) and
verifies that β∗ ?= β. If true, N computes γ = rN ⊕ fN ,
a+N = γ ⊕ η and b+N = γ ⊕ µ. The shared session key
kS is computed as h(idN , rN , fN , xN ) and the authentication
parameters (aN , bN ) are replaced with (a+N , b
+
N ).
B. Analysis of the Li et al.’s Scheme
1) Security Analysis: In addition to provisioning of mutual
“direct” authentication [14], Li et al.’s scheme fulfills all the
security criteria as defined in Section II-B. Moreover, the
scheme also protects the master secret (kHN ) in the event
of compromise of various nodes of the WBAN. For sake of
brevity, we will restrict our security analysis to highlight only
the vulnerabilities of Li et al.’s scheme.
Discussion about Forward Secrecy. Li et al. claimed a
forward security property of their scheme. Their definition
of forward secrecy varies from the generally accepted one.
According to Li et al. the goal of forward secrecy is to
protect other (past / future) session keys in the event of
compromise of the current session key kS . However, the
conventional definition of forward secrecy states that in the
event of compromise of the long term secrets of the protocol
participant(s), an adversary should not be able to obtain any of
the past session keys [15]. While Li et al.’s scheme is forward
secure according to their own definition, it is not forward
secure in a conventional sense.
2) Privacy Analysis:
The Anonymity Dilemma. It is known apriori to the attacker
that all nodes ultimately communicate with HN . As the node
identifier idN is always masked (by taking an XOR of it with
a fresh random value) in Li et al.’s protocol, anonymity in
Li et al.’s protocol is preserved from “direct” privacy attacks.
However, now consider the situation depicted in Fig. 3, where
an intermediary node IN is providing the relaying service to
various nodes N . In the second pass of Li et al.’s scheme, it
Fig. 3: The privacy dilemma of Li et al.’s scheme
is not clear how the intermediary node IN would be able to
identify the original node N out of the “anonymity set” [16]
for onward forwarding of the tuple 〈α, β, η, µ〉 received from
HN . One naive way to resolve this is to allow IN to broadcast
the second pass of protocol for all nodes. However, this
approach is unsuitable for already energy-constrained WBAN
nodes as they will need to perform additional communication
(radio reception) and computational steps for each and every
transmission. This is a privacy dilemma from which Li et al.’s
scheme suffers.
Session Unlinkability. While Li et al. claim their scheme
provides session unlinkability, we show this to be untrue. We
highlight a weakness in Li et al.’s key agreement protocol,
which allows a passive attacker to easily link two or more
sessions of the same node N . The attack proceeds as follows:
Session # 1. Suppose that a run of Li et al.’s key agreement
protocol is carried out between node N and HN . A passive
attacker A observes the contents of the messages being ex-
changed. From Step 1 of Section III-A3, A records the value
yN = xN ⊕ rN . Then, from Step 3 of Sec III-A3, A records
α = xN ⊕ fN . Now, A obtains the value γ = rN ⊕ fN =
α ⊕ yN . Further, A records the values η and µ from Step 3
of Section III-A3 and uses γ to compute:
a+N = γ ⊕ η; b+N = γ ⊕ µ.
Session # 2. Now, A observes key exchange protocol sessions
between various nodes and HN . A compares the values of
the parameters aN and bN from Step 1 of the protocol with
the saved values of a+N and b
+
N . When A finds a match, A
concludes with almost certainty that another key exchange
session has been initiated by the same node N . This is correct
because node N uses the updated authentication parameters
a+N and b
+
N in its next run of the protocol. In this way, A can
track and link sessions of node N , demonstrating that Li et
al.’s scheme does not achieve session unlinkability.
3) Functional Requirements: Li et al.’s scheme can be
easily adapted for direct communication between N and HN
without the involvement of IN . Since this scheme employs
only symmetric cryptographic primitives, it is extremely ef-
ficient from a computation, communication and storage over-
head perspective and there is no requirement of any additional
network infrastructure. Assuming a hash function with a digest
length of B bits and 16 bit intermediary node IDs (i.e.
id′IN ); Table II highlights the communication, computation
and storage overhead of Li et al.’s scheme. In this table, h
denotes one hash operation, ⊕ denotes an XOR operation
and m denotes the number of intermediary nodes in the
WBAN. Note that, contrary to the assumption made by Li
et al. in Section 5.4 [7] about the arbitrary length of the
timestamp field, it is implicitly the same length as of the hash
function digest because, as described earlier in Section III-A3,
tidN = h(idN ⊕ tN , rN ). This is not commensurate with
the length of the timestamp field as defined in IEEE Std
802.15.6, which is three octets or 24 bits. Regarding state
maintenance by HN , in case of [7], HN needs to maintain
states concerning the relay nodes IN , which is an undesirable
feature as already explained earlier in Section II-B.
IV. OUR PPKA PROTOCOL
In this section we propose a PPKA protocol which rectify
the problems highlighted in Section III-B. While devising
this protocol, we have tried to preserve the original elegance,
simplicity and efficiency of the scheme in [7]. The protocol
TABLE II: Overheads associated with Li et al.’s scheme
Index Node N Hub Node HN
Computation Overhead 3h+ 7⊕ 5h+ 12⊕
Communication Overhead 5B bits 4B + 16 bits
Storage Overhead 3B bits (B + 16m) bits
TABLE III: Detail of additional symbols
Symbol Description
id′N Session identity chosen randomly by N
Enc(k,m) Encryption of message m under symmetric key k
Dec(k, c) Decryption of ciphertext c under symmetric key k
addresses the privacy flaws present in Li et al.’s scheme. Detail
of additional symbols used in our PPKA protocols is given in
Table III.The phases of our PPKA Protocol are described as
follows:
1) Initialization Phase: Same as [7].
2) Registration Phase: The intermediary node (IN) is not
provided with a relay identity id′IN . Parameters 〈idN , aN , bN 〉
get stored in N .
3) Authentication Phase: The various steps of the authen-
tication phase are depicted in Fig. 4 and are as follows:
Step 1: N → IN : 〈tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id′N 〉. N picks
a random rN and creates timestamp tN . It then computes
xN = aN ⊕ idN , yN = xN ⊕ rN . It further picks a random
pseudonym id′N to be used as a temporary identifier for this
session only, and calculates tidN = h(idN , id′N , tN , rN ) and
sets the “Relay Field” of the underlying “MAC Header” to
value 1, according to sub-clause 6.10 of [3].
Step 2: IN → HN : 〈tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id′N 〉. IN checks
the value of “Relay Field” and forwards the tuple to HN .
Step 3: HN → IN : 〈α, β, η, µ, id′N 〉. After receipt of the
tuple from IN , HN verifies the validity of the timestamp tN .
Upon success of this check, it computes k∗N = kHN ⊕ aN ⊕
bN , x
∗
N = h(kHN , k
∗
N ), id
∗
N = x
∗
N⊕aN , r∗N = x∗N⊕yN and
tid∗N = h(id
∗
N , id
′
N , tN , r
∗
N ). It then verifies whether tidN
?
=
tid∗N . Then, a random fN is chosen and α = xN ⊕ fN , γ =
rN⊕fN⊕h(idN , tN ) and γ′ = rN⊕fN⊕h(idN , tN , rN , id′N )
are computed. Then a new k+N is picked and a
+
N = idN ⊕
h(kHN , k
+
N ), b
+
N = kHN ⊕ a+N ⊕ k+N , η = γ ⊕ a+N , µ =
γ′⊕b+N , β = h(xN , rN , fN , η, µ, id′N ) are computed. Finally,
the shared session key kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN ) is computed
and stored in memory, and the value of the underlying “Relay
Field” is set to 1.
Step 4: IN → N : 〈α, β, η, µ, id′N 〉. IN checks the “Relay
Field” of the message received from the Hub node. If “Relay
Field” value is set to 1, then it notes the identifier id′N received
in the tuple for onward forwarding of the tuple to node N .
Step 5: Upon receiving a response from IN , N computes
f∗N = xN ⊕α and β∗ = h(xN , rN , f∗N , η, µ, id′N ) and verifies
that β∗ ?= β. If so, N computes γ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕ h(idN , tN ),
γ′ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕ h(idN , tN , rN , id′N ), a+N = γ ⊕ η and
b+N = γ
′ ⊕ µ. The shared session key kS is computed
TABLE IV: Overheads associated with PPKA Protocol
Index Node N Hub Node HN
Computation Overhead 5h+ 9⊕ 7h+ 14⊕
Communication Overhead 5B + 16 bits 4B + 16 bits
Storage Overhead 3B bits B bits
as h(idN , rN , fN , xN ), and the authentication parameters
(aN , bN ) are updated by being replaced with (a+N , b
+
N ).
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PPKA PROTOCOL
A. Security and Privacy Analysis
Our PPKA protocol preserves all the security properties of-
fered by Li et al’s scheme as all the measures ensuring various
security attributes in [7] remain intact in our PPKA proposal
too. Moreover, the protocol also achieves the anonymity ob-
jective of keeping the long term identity idN of the node N
secret. The PPKA protocol resolves the privacy dilemma (See
Section III-B2) of [7] through the use of pseudonym id′N .
The inclusion of this pseudonym in all messages enables an
intermediary node IN to identify its communicating peers for
that particular run of the protocol. Also, as these pseudonyms
are changed in every other run of the protocol, the anonymity
of node N is preserved. In Li et al’s scheme, an adversary was
able to link two sessions to the same node N because of the
unmasking of the updated authentication parameters (a+N , b
+
N )
which in turn was due to the adversary being capable of cal-
culating the mask γ, as explained in Section III-B2. However
in our PPKA protocol, due to the inclusion of the additional
masking parameters h(idN , tN ) and h(idN , tN , rN , id′N ) , the
adversary is now unable to unmask the updated authentication
parameters (a+N , b
+
N ). Therefore, the modified schemes provide
the desirable privacy attribute of session unlinkability.
B. Functional Requirements
The proposed PPKA protocol can be easily adapted for
direct communication between N and HN by removal of
Steps 2 and 4 out of the Authentication Phase. As our PPKA
protocol is also based on symmetric cryptographic primitives,
it preserves the efficiency of the original scheme from a
computation, communication and storage perspective without
the aid of any additional network infrastructure. Moreover, in
our protocol the timestamp field can be of any arbitrary length
to suit the underlying protocol layers unlike [7]. Assuming a
B bit hash digest and 16 bit pseudo identity id′N for node
N , Table IV depicts the various overheads associated with
PPKA Protocol. In this table, h denotes an instance of a
hash operation and ⊕ denotes an XOR operation. From a
computational perspective, single instances of hash operation
and encryption operation have been considered equal [17].
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
We proposed an authenticated key agreement protocol suit-
able for WBANs. The protocol is based upon symmetric
cryptographic components only and thus is highly efficient
N IN HN
〈idN , aN , bN 〉 〈 〉 〈kHN 〉
Picks rN
Generates timestamp tN
Computes xN = aN ⊕ idN , Validates tN , Computes
yN = xN ⊕ rN , Checks k∗N = kHN ⊕ aN ⊕ bN ,
Picks id′N ,Computes < tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id
′
N > Relay < tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , id
′
N > x
∗
N = h(kHN , k
∗
N ),
tidN = h(idN , id
′
N , tN , rN ) Field id
∗
N = x
∗
N ⊕ aN ,
Sets “Relay Field” to 1 r∗N = x
∗
N ⊕ yN ,
tid
∗
N = h(id
∗
N , id
′
N , tN , r
∗
N )
Verify that tidN
?
= tid
∗
N
Picks fN
Computes α = xN ⊕ fN ,
γ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕ h(idN , tN )
Computes f∗N = xN ⊕ α, γ′ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕ h(idN , tN , rN , id′N )
β
∗
= h(xN , rN , f
∗
N , η, µ, id
′
N ) Picks new k
+
N , Computes
Verifies β∗ ?= β. Computes Checks a+N = idN ⊕ h(kHN , k+N ),
γ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕ h(idN , tN ), < α, β, η, µ, id
′
N > Relay < α, β, η, µ, id
′
N > b
+
N = kHN ⊕ a+N ⊕ k+N ,
γ
′
= rN ⊕ fN ⊕ h(idN , tN , rN , id′N ), Field η = γ ⊕ a+N , µ = γ′ ⊕ b+N ,
a
+
N = γ ⊕ η, b+N = γ′ ⊕ µ, kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN )
kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN ), β = h(xN , rN , fN , η, µ, id
′
N )
Replaces (aN , bN ) with (a
+
N , b
+
N ) Stores session key kS
Stores session key kS Sets “Relay Field” to 1
Fig. 4: PPKA Protocol
and avoids the additional burden of deploying and managing
an associated public key infrastructure. In fact, our protocol
is suitable for every application scenario where efficiency is
of essence and the network can be initialized by a System
Administrator. In addition to the requisite security guarantees,
the proposed protocol also offers appropriate privacy attributes
suitable for a wide variety of application scenarios. The
proposed protocol emerges as an attractive alternate for the
current key exchange methods described in the IEEE 802.15.6
standard, which are based upon legacy public key based
primitives and do not offer any privacy features. It would be
interesting to investigate whether future research can yield a
scheme which would be based on symmetric primitives and
still offers forward secrecy and KCI resilience.
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